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   Abstract ⎯ It is well known that wireless networks 
have become one of the most important part used 
communication systems, in particular for ubiquitous 
computing. However, providing secure communication 
for wireless networks has become one of the prime 
concerns.  Quantum cryptography, namely Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD), offers the promise of 
unconditional security.  In this paper, we shall extend 
our previous research work to a new method of 
integrating quantum cryptography for key distribution 
in 802.11 wireless networks. Our contributions, based 
on our previous results [1], are as follows: (a) We shall 
show how QKD can be used in IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks to securely distribute the keys. (b) We shall 
introduce a method that take the advantage of mutual 
authentication features offered by some EAP variants 
of 802.1X Port-Based Network Access Control. (c) 
Finally, we present a new code called Quantum 
Message Integrity Code (Q-MIC) which provides 
mutual authentication between the two communication 
parties and its implementation   
I. Introduction 
 It is obviously fact we face that wireless 
networks are becoming ubiquitous in homes, offices 
and enterprises with its ability to provide high-speed 
high-quality information exchange between portable 
devices.  As the wireless communication has gone 
through rapid advancements during the last few 
decades, an increasing number of government 
agencies, businesses and home users are either using, 
or considering using, wireless technologies in their 
environments [24]. Therefore it is obvious that in the 
near future wireless technology will dominate the 
communication industry. While wireless networks 
and its applications are becoming popular every day, 
security issues associated with it have become a 
great concern. In this paper we are going to make a 
novel method to create an implementation of 
quantum cryptography for key distribution in 802.11 
networks. 
As wireless communications use the airwaves, 
they are intrinsically more vulnerable to 
interceptions and attacks than its wired counterparts. 
As the service become more popular, there are a 
great number of security risks associated with the 
current wireless protocols and encryption methods 
[6, 8]. Some of the common types of attacks against 
wireless networks are; Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks, Identity theft (MAC spoofing), Man-in-the-
middle attacks, ARP poisoning, etc. DoS attacks are 
typically associated with 802.11 wireless 
communications [24]. 
Based on the laws of physics, quantum 
cryptography allows exchange of cryptographic key 
between two remote parties with unconditional 
security. The foundation of quantum cryptography 
lies in the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which 
states that certain pairs of physical properties are 
related in such a way that measuring one property 
prevents the observer from simultaneously knowing 
the value of the other. So that act of an eavesdropper 
intercepting a photon will irretrievably change the 
information encoded on that photon, thereby 
detecting any security breach. It uses quantum states 
of photons to transfer cryptographic key material. 
Quantum cryptography is used to produce and 
distribute a key, known as Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD). Several QKD protocols such as 
BB84 [7], B92 [20] and six-state [18] exist as of 
now. Out of those, BB84 is more popular and widely 
used in practical networks [25]. As the nature of 
BB84 and B92 [7, 18, 20, 21, 22] we have chosen a 
variation of BB84 called SARG04 (Scarani, Acin, 
Ribordy, and Gisin) [21] to employ in our current 
work. SARG04 is robust against photon-number 
splitting (PNS) attack [21, 22]. Explaining how 
SARG04 protocol works is not in scope of this 
paper.  QKD has gone through significant 
advancements in optical networks [17, 19, 26, 27]. 
However, QKD with respect to free-space is showing 
rather slow progress. One of the main reasons for 
this slow progress in free space photon transmission 
is the difficulty in providing Line-Of-Sight (LOS) 
between the transmitter and the receiver for long 
distances.  However, there are some papers discussed 
this issue [23, 28], we may use different models for 
different situations of the multi-path communication 
channels, such as almost-LOS (ALOS), quasi-LOS 
(QLOS), non-LOS (NLOS) with responding statistic 
distributions, which will not be discussed in our 
current paper.     
In our work, we target the IEEE 802.11 wireless 
network to integrate with quantum cryptography. 
Since the coverage area of 802.11 network small, the 
line-of-sight issue between the participating entities 
can be minimized.  Also, for such a small distances, 
the impact to the photon transmission from 
environmental conditions such as noise is very low.  
Also we shall discuss this with statistic models in 
another paper to focus on ALOS and QLOS cases. 
The IEEE 802.11 [2] wireless local area networks 
seem to present high interest to be used with 
quantum cryptography due to various reasons [7].  In 
fact, put the statistic models aside, one of the main 
advantages we can take is the range of coverage 
offered by IEEE 802.11 networks.  The range of a 
typical WLAN node is about 100 m.  So that 802.11 
networks deployed in places like coffee shops, air 
ports, conference halls etc.  This offers the line-of-
sight path between the users and network apparatus.  
On the other hand the applications that make use 
of 802.11 requires secured communication path with 
the service provider.  Quantum cryptography has the 
potential to offer this much needed secured data 
communications for 802.11 wireless networks.  
Hence it is worth exploring the possibility of using 
Quantum Cryptography in 802.11 WLANS.  
 
II. IEEE 802.11i Standard 
 Before we introduce our new protocol, we need 
to have a closer look at IEEE 802.11i standard as 
some of which we shall introduce into our current 
work.  The security of 802.11 is defined by Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP).  However WEP was 
identified by cryptanalysts to have severe security 
weaknesses. As a result of this, an amendment to the 
IEEE 802.11 standard called IEEE 802.11i [3] was 
approved in 2004. 
IEEE 802.11i is designed to provide enhanced 
security in the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer 
for 802.11 networks. It defines two classes of 
security algorithms: Robust Security Network 
Association (RSNA) and Transition Security 
Network (TSN). IEEE 802.11i describes two new 
confidentiality algorithms to address those two 
cipher suites, namely Temporal Key Integrity 
Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-mode/CBC-MAC 
Protocol (CCMP) respectively [12].  IEEE 802.1X 
offers an effective framework for authenticating, 
managing keys and controlling user traffic to protect 
large networks. It employs the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [13] to allow a wide 
variety of authentication mechanisms, which we are 
going to keep it in our current work. 
It is noted that 802.1X authentication process 
happen among three main elements. The 
Authenticator or the Access Point allows only the 
supplicants who are authorized by the authentication 
server to gain access to the network.    
RSNA defines two types of key hierarchies to 
divide initial key material into useful keys. The two 
key hierarchies are: Pairwise key hierarchy, which is 
used to protect unicast traffic and, Group key 
hierarchy which is used to protect multicast and 
broadcast traffic. We can show the Pairwise key 
hierarchy in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: IEEE 802.11i Pairwise Key Hierarchy [3].  
  
III. QKD for Wireless Networks 
As described in above, wireless networks are 
subject to various security risks. Exchanging data 
over a wireless network must be done with great care 
because traffic interceptions in wireless networks are 
much easier. Therefore, in order to provide privacy 
for the users, it is essential to authenticate users with 
the network elements. Although there are lots of 
researches are happening to improve this daunting 
task of providing secure data communication to 
users, they are still subject to security attacks.  
Quantum cryptography or QKD is one area that did 
not get enough attention in wireless networks so far 
with respect to providing secrete key distribution.  
Even though there are lots of things need to be 
investigated before this technology applies to the real 
world.  Our current work is part of the contributions 
toward to the final successful target.  In this section 
we are going to build a bridge between QKD and 
wireless networks.  
It is well known that the classical public-key 
cryptography uses asymmetric keys, with one that is 
private and another one that is public. The receiving 
station uses the matching private key to decrypt the 
data upon reception. Each station keeps their private 
key hidden in order to avoid compromising 
encrypted information. In addition, to protecting 
information from hackers, stations can use public 
key cryptography to authenticate themselves to other 
stations or access points. The intrinsic weakness of 
this classical public-key cryptography is based on the 
fact that the private key is always linked 
mathematically to the public key [14]. Due to this 
reason, it is always possible to attack a public-key 
system if the eavesdroppers equipped with 
sufficiently large computational resources. 
Therefore, the mathematical problem to derive the 
private key from public key must be as difficult as 
possible. Hence those systems cannot provide any 
indication of eavesdropping or guarantee the key 
security. 
Quantum cryptography exploits the fundamental 
laws of quantum physics where nobody can measure 
a state of an arbitrary polarized photon carrying 
information without introducing disturbances. 
Classical key distribution can always be passively 
monitored, without the legitimate users being aware 
that any eavesdropping has taken place. Whereas in 
quantum mechanics, any projective measurement 
will induce disturbances hence eavesdropping can be 
detected. Due to this reason, use of QKD in wireless 
key distribution will provide huge advantage with 
respect to data security. 
In 802.11i networks there are two places where 
the mutual authentication can be employed. Firstly, 
by selecting a correct EAP type such as EAP-TLS, 
EAP-TTLS that offer mutual authentication during 
IEEE 802.1X authentication process. Secondly, the 
IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake makes the mutual 
authentication happens in second and third messages. 
In the second message of 4-way handshake, 
authenticator receives the reply and message 
integrity code (MIC) from the supplicant. 
Authenticator checks the received and calculated 
MIC values to authenticate the Supplicant. In the 
third message, Authenticator sends the calculated 
MIC to the Supplicant.  Supplicant then checks the 
MIC to authenticate the Authenticator, achieving 
mutual authentication.  
 
IV. The Proposed Protocol 
In our work, we paid special attention on the stage 
where the mutual authentication takes place in 
802.11i networks. Therefore, we shall take the 
advantage of EAP types such as EAP-TLS, EAP-
TTLS which offer mutual authentication, to merge 
802.11i networks with QKD. In order to make QKD 
well match wireless communications, i.e. our aim is 
to introduce quantum key transmission soon after the 
802.1X authentication is completed. The proposed 
protocol is shown in figure 2.  
  As described in flow 13 of figure 1, the last 
message of 802.1X protocol is the EAPOL message 
giving the EAP Key from Authenticator to the 
Supplicant. Since the two parties are mutually 
authenticated at this stage, we know that this 
message is genuine. We use this message as the 
starting point of quantum transmission. By this way 
we can safely start the quantum key exchange. As 
soon as the Supplicant receives the EAP Key 
message, the communication switches to quantum 
channel. 
 
Figure 2: The Proposed Protocol 
 Once the photon transmission finishes, the 
communication switches back to classical wireless 
channel. Afterwards they complete the SARG04 
quantum key exchange as shown in flows 3 to 6 of 
Figure 2.   Due to atmospheric noise, dark counts in 
the photon detectors etc, lot of errors have been 
introduced into the transmission.  Some of the 
transferred bits will get discarded during the final 
key recovery process of SARG04 protocol.  Our next 
aim is to set the length of Q-Key equal to the length 
of PTK.  For example, CCMP, PTK is 256 bits, 
while TKIP occupies 384 bits for PMK.  So that we 
have to make sure the derived Q-Key will contain 
bits greater than or equal to the number of bits of 
PTK.   We get this stripped Q-Key as the PTK.   
Then from PTK, we can derive KEK, KCK and 
TK, while from KCK, MIC can be calculated. We 
shall use this MIC in our subsequent protocol 
messages to implement mutual authentication. In 
order to simplify the operation in wireless networks 
at this stage, Supplicant performs XOR operation 
with the MIC and the first set of bits of equal length 
in PMK. We call this resulted MIC as Quantum MIC 
(Q-MIC) and make the following protocol:   
 
Q-MIC = (MIC) XOR (first bits of PMK equivalent  
                             to the length of MIC) 
 
The Supplicant then sends the Q-MIC to 
Authenticator as shown in flow 7 of Figure 2. Upon 
receiving Q-MIC, Authenticator verifies the Q-MIC. 
Since the Authenticator is in possession of all the 
keys, it can calculate its own Q-MIC and compares 
with the one came from the Supplicant. If they 
match, the Supplicant is authenticated.  
Supplicant verifies the Q-MIC to authenticate the 
Authenticator, thus achieving the mutual 
authentication. From now on, both parties use TK to 
encrypt the data and start secure communication and 
also use the GTK for multicast applications if 
needed. 
Recent research work explores some of the flaws 
of 4-way handshake [5, 6, 8, 16]. It was shown that 
the message 1 of 4-way handshake is subject to DoS 
attacks.  For example, intruders can flood message 1 
to the supplicant after the 4-way handshake has 
completed, causing the system to fail. Since key 
distribution of our protocol is done by the SARG04 
protocol. 
 In order to under our protocol let’s assume an 
eavesdropper send a fake photon transmission 
towards Authenticator soon after the EAP Key 
message (flow 2 of Figure 2).  Then once the Q-Key 
is derived by SARG04 process, supplicant sends Q-
MIC to Authenticator in flow 7. Authenticator can 
check this Q-MIC value as it has all the ingredients 
to generate its own Q-MIC.  Therefore, any fake 
SARG04 processes can be known at this stage.  
 
V.  Implementation of QKD 
  The Quantum key transmission happens in two 
stages, in terns of concepts, which can be shown in 
Figure 3.  It is noted that in Figure 3 the Wi-Fi 
connections are classical channels and the “optical 
Fiber” channels are quantum channels.  
Stage1:Quantum channel (one way communication)  
This transmission could happen in either through free 
space or optical fiber.  At present this 
implementation is being done at the Lab. 
Stage 2:Classical channel (two way communication) 
This phase deals with recovering identical 
secrete keys at both ends.  
 
Figure 3.  Simplified block diagram of a point-to-point QKD 
link in concept.   
In terms of set up, as shown in Figure 4, the 
quantum channel is taking the task that using 
quantum cryptography to establish the key used for 
the encryption of user data in 802.11i, which is the 
TK.    
When the quantum handshake completion the 
wireless Wi-Fi will either refuse the subscriber 
station to communicate data via the classical channel 
or take the subscriber station to access the Wi-Fi and 
the system becomes “normal” Wi-Fi working states, 
which will run the communications in the defined 
classical channels. 
The quantum channel between Alice and Bob1 is 
shown in Fig. 4, the channel between Alice and Bob2 
is similar. At Alice, laser pulses are generated by 
vertical cavity surface emitting lasers (VCSELs) and 
attenuated into single photon level. The polarization 
states of photons are set by polarizers according to 
corresponding protocol (B92 or BB84). Then 
photons are combined and sent into a fiber through a 
non-polarizing beam splitter (NPBS).   
 
 
Figure 4.   Quantum channel implementing by optical fibers: 
schematic diagram of the QKD system with PRAC sub-systems. 
VCSEL: Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Laser ; Pol.: Polarizer; 
NPBS: Non-Polarizing beam splitter; P.C.: Polarization 
Controller; PBS: Polarizing beam splitter; APD: Silicon avalanche 
photodiode.  
Then photons are combined and sent into a fiber 
through a non-polarizing beam splitter (NPBS). The 
polarizers Pol. 0A, 0B, 1A, and 1B are oriented to 
0°, 90°, +45°, and -45° respectively. Only two 
channels, 0A and 1A, are used for B92, while all four 
channels are used for BB84. At Bob, polarization 
controllers recover the polarization state of photons 
to their original state at Alice. The 3-dB coupler 
randomly chooses the detection base and the 
polarization beam splitter (PBS) helps to determine 
the key value via an agent-oriented. Finally the 
photons are detected by single photon detectors 
(APDs). Two APDs, 0A and 1A, are used for B92, 
while four APDs are all used for BB84. The quantum 
bit error rate (QBER) for our experiment is 0.04 and 
due to modifications, i.e. most of the computations 
and bit comparisons are done in memory, the 
efficiency has been improved by 60%. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Risks are inherent in wireless technology. Most 
significant source of risks in wireless networks is 
that the technology’s underlying communication 
medium, the airwave, is open to intruders. Due to 
this reason a lot of efforts have been put to address 
security issues in wireless networks.   
The advantage of quantum cryptography over 
traditional key exchange methods is that the 
exchange of information can be shown to be secure 
in a very strong sense, without making assumptions 
about the intractability of certain mathematical 
problems. In our work, we take advantage of the 
“unconditional security” offered by QKD to merge 
with IEEE 802.11i wireless network. For small 
wireless networks such as IEEE 802.11, quantum 
cryptography can serve better to provide secure data 
communications.  Regarding the line of sight (LOS) 
problem occurring from the QKD to the wireless 
networks, we have noted the there are three models 
can be discussed [20] namely, less scattered LOS 
short-rang indoor propagation environments, log-
normal distributed channel, quasi-LOS links may be 
well modeled by Nakagami distributed channel and 
Gaussian distributed channel with highly-scattered 
outdoor NLOS propagation environments.  Due to 
the conference paper size the analyses will be 
presented in another paper. 
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